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1 Introduction 
The 2008/9 agricultural season is the fourth year in which the Malawi Government has 
implemented its national agricultural input subsidy programme. The programme has 
attracted widespread international interest, within Africa and beyond, and is widely seen as a 
pioneer of a new generation of large scale ‘smart subsidies’ to get agriculture moving after 
years of stagnation. As the programme enters its fourth year, a substantial amount of formal 
and informal experience has been accumulated regarding the achievements of the 
programme and the challenges it faces in a changing international economic environment.  
This paper draws on experience and reviews of the 2005/6, 2006/7 and 2007/8 programmes, 
and on emerging experience with the 2008/9 programme. It describes the main elements of 
the programme, the way that different aspects of these have changed as lessons have been 
learnt and new challenges faced, the achievements of the programme, and the challenges 
and opportunities there are in seeking to improve its effectiveness, efficiency and 
sustainability. It was originally prepared in December 2008. This June 2009 revision updates 
information for the 2008/9 programme where it is available. 2008/9 programme benefit:cost 
estimates have been removed and have not been updated as there are some uncertainties 
regarding programme costs, and to present estimates at this time without first resolving 
these uncertainties will add little to the earlier analysis and is likely to be misleading.  
2 Background 
Malawi has implemented different kinds of agricultural input subsidy over many years. 
Following severe food security difficulties in the early part of this century, however, the 
government decided to implement in 2005/6 a very large scale subsidy using vouchers, and 
targeting roughly 50% of farmers across the country. The programme has been repeated in 
subsequent seasons, building on core experience but expanding the programme and 
modifying implementation systems from year to year. The objective of the programme (which 
has been refined over time) has been to increase resource poor smallholder famers’ access 
to improved agricultural inputs in order to achieve food self sufficiency and increased income 
of resource poor famers’ through increased food and cash crop production.  
3 Main elements of the programme  
The core of the AISP is the transfer to selected rural households of a voucher which will 
benefit them either by enabling them to increase their use of fertiliser, seed or pesticides or 
by effectively giving them a cash transfer as they either sell the voucher or they use it to 
finance the purchase of inputs that they would have purchased anyway. If the voucher leads 
to increased (incremental) input use it should lead to an increase in agricultural land and 
labour productivity and to extra production of the crop to which it is applied. There are then 
subsequent effects of this in terms of increased household income, changes in market 
demand and/or supply (and prices), changes in labour demand and supply and wages (due 
to the large scale of the programme), soil fertility, and people’s knowledge of and attitudes to 
input use. Other major impacts of the AISP are that it is a major intervention in input markets 
– affecting fertiliser and seed importers, seed producers, and input wholesalers, retailers, 
and agrodealers. It is also a major logistical activity involving very significant resources in the 
purchasing and transport of inputs and in the distribution and redemption of vouchers, with 
potential to crowd out other agricultural services.  
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Table 1 Summary of 2005/6 to 2008/9 programmes 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9* 
  planned actual planned actual planned actual planned actual 
Fertiliser voucher distribution (mt 
equivalent) 137,006 166,156 150,000 200,128 170,000 216,000 170,000 195, 369 
Households receiving one or  more 
fertiliser coupons 1,370,060 n/a 1,500,000 1,772,280 1,700,000 n/a 1,700,000 2,448,000 
Subsidised 'maize' fertiliser  sales 
(mt)  100,006 108,986 130,000 152,989 150,000 192,976 150,000 178.4**  
Subsidised 'tobacco' fertiliser sales 
(mt)  37,000 22,402 20,000 21,699 20,000 23,578 20,000 19.6**  
Total Subsidised fertiliser  sales (mt)  137,006 131,388 150,000 174,688 170,000 216,553 170,000 202,278 
Redemption price (MK/50 kg) 
950 for maize 
fertilisers, 1450 for 
tobacco fertilisers 
  950   900   800 
Voucher value (MK/bag, approx))   1,750   2,480   3,299   9,000 
Subsidy as % of unsubsidised  price 
(approx)   64%   72%   79%   92% 
Subsidised maize seed  sales (MT)  6000 ??  n/a 4,524 n/a 5,541 4,750 ** 5,365 
% Hybrid seed  0 0 n/a 61% n/a 53% n/a 84% 
Cotton seed (mt) 0 0 0 0 n/a 390 n/a 435 
Legume seed (mt) 0 0 0 0 n/a 24 n/a tbc 
Cotton chemicals vouchers 0 0 0 0 200,000 131,848 200,000  tbc 
Grain storage pesticide vouchers             2,000,000 tbc 
Total programme cost  (MK million)  5,100 7,200 7,500 12,743 11,500 16,346 19,480 tbc. 
* 2008/9:  figures available 16th June, household figures based on MoASF far families.  ** provisional figures from sales monitoring 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet), 2006/7 (SOAS et al) and 2007/8 (MoAFS) evaluation reports; key informants; MoAFS Implementation 
guidelines; GoM budget statistics; 2008/9 preliminary survey results. 
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Table 1 shows the main features of the completed 2005/6, 2006/7 and 2007/8 programmes. 
Information on the 2008/9 programme is also provided, as available on 16th June. More 
detailed information about these variables and about changes in programme implementation 
and impact is provided and discussed in the following sections.  
 
4 Programme design and implementation  
The 2005/6 programme provided the base or foundation on which subsequent programmes 
have built. We therefore describe this in more detail before considering changes made in 
subsequent programmes.  
The objectives of the programme were to promote access to and use of fertilizers in both 
maize and tobacco production in order to increase agricultural productivity and food security. 
Fertiliser coupons were distributed to districts and EPAs in two rounds. In the first round 
allocation was broadly in proportion to cropped maize and tobacco areas. Coupons were 
distributed to districts and Traditional Authorities (TAs) by the Ministry of Agriculture. TAs 
were supposed to allocate coupons between villages, to Village Development Committees, 
who were then supposed to identify recipients to receive coupons which they could then 
redeem, at a reduced cash price, for any of the four fertilizer types. There was considerable 
variation between areas in the criteria determining prioritization and selection of 
beneficiaries, numbers of people receiving coupons, and numbers of coupons received per 
recipient household. A second, supplementary round of coupon allocation and distribution 
was made later in the season. 6,000MT OPV maize seed were also offered for sale without 
coupons at a price of MK150/3kg as compared with a market price of MK500/3kg. 48% of 
fertiliser purchases were supplied by private sector importers, but all distribution of 
subsidised inputs was by ADMARC and SFFRFM.  
Holders of coupons were entitled to redeem coupons for fertilizer at the rate of 1 coupon and 
MK950 for one 50kg bag of 23:20 or urea (‘maize fertilisers’), and at 1 coupon plus MK1,450 
per bag of Compound D or CAN (‘tobacco fertilisers’). These on average offered a two-thirds 
subsidy to farmers on the market cost of inputs. Coupons intended for different types of 
fertiliser were not marked as such and many coupons allocated for ‘tobacco fertilisers’ may 
have been used to buy ‘maize fertiliser’. Sales continued into January, and in different areas 
were limited either by a lack of fertilizer stock or by a lack of coupons. In the latter case 
supplementary coupons were used in some areas, but shortages of fertilizer in time for it to 
be useful meant that significant numbers of coupons were not used. ADMARC/SFFRFM 
report total subsidy sales of 131,803 tonnes (representing 2.62 million coupons). No 
information is available on seed sales.  
The programme is reported to have cost MK7.2 billion against a budget of MK5.1 billion. The 
reported programme cost excludes overhead costs but it is likely that it allows for only partial 
deduction of farmer payments to ADMARC and SFFRFM for coupon redemption: these 
amounted to a total of MK2.7 billion.  
Following the popularity of the 2005/6 programme in Malawi and perception of its success, 
the government decided to implement the programme in 2006/7 with a number of 
modifications (see table 2). These involved an increase in the overall amount of maize 
fertilisers to be subsidised, a standard redemption price of MK950 per bag for all fertiliser 
types, improved coupon security (with differentiation by fertiliser type), involvement of the 
logistics unit, involvement of some large input supply companies in retail sales of subsidised 
fertiliser, and maize seed vouchers which could be exchanged at a wider range of outlets 
(including agro-dealers) for different quantities of OPV or hybrid. The seed component, some 
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logistic unit costs and an independent programme evaluation were funded by donors, who 
had not directly financed any part of the 2005/6 programme (other than through budget 
support). Donors also funded a buy-back scheme, which reduced the risks to government of 
carrying stocks over at the end of the year if private sales led to lower than expected sales 
by ADMARC and SFFRFM. 
Planned and achieved subsidy sales and costs in 2006/7 (and other years) were shown in 
table 1, and further information on regional allocations is shown in table 3. The issue of 
supplementary fertiliser vouchers together with availability of fertiliser for sales by private 
companies (who sold just under 30% of subsidised sales, see table 6) led to higher sales 
volumes than budgeted and these, together with higher prices than budgeted, led to 
significant budget overruns. These problems were not faced with seed sales where no extra 
coupons were issued.  
Growing experience with the programme led to consolidation in 2007/8 of many of the 
changes made in 2006/7, together with further changes to extend the scope of the 
programme. Programme objectives and beneficiary targeting criteria were amended to give 
greater emphasis to concerns for vulnerable households. Targeted quantities of subsidised 
maize fertiliser and seed were again increased, to roughly equal disbursements the previous 
year. Changes were made to coupon allocation systems between districts to provide greater 
weight to the number of farming households (and less weight to crop areas) and (following 
problems in some areas in 2006/7) systems for allocation and distribution of coupons within 
districts modified to give less power to TAs and more responsibility to MoAFS staff.  The shift 
in the responsibility is a reflection of greater support from communities to disburse vouchers 
through MoAFS staff following the experimentation in the 2006/07 programme. Registration 
of all farm households was completed but not in time to allow use of the register in coupon 
allocation to individual households. In addition to maize seed vouchers provided with maize 
fertiliser coupons, extra ‘flexible vouchers’ for maize or legume seed were issued (allowing 
farmers to choose what seed they wanted, though in fact legume seed supplies were very 
limited), and coupons were also distributed through ADDs for cotton seed and chemicals. A 
‘remote EPA premium’ was introduced to provide incentives to private retailers to extend 
their networks into areas with low coverage by private retailers.  
Subsidised fertiliser volumes were again significantly over budget, with associated cost 
overruns, so that with higher than budgeted input prices programme costs were 29% above 
the budget in 2007/08 (compared to 18% in 2006/07). However, private sector subsidy sales 
were roughly the same as the previous year (increasing by only 6% from 49,000 mt to 
52,000mt) whereas parastatal sales increased by approximately 30% from 125,000mt to 
165,000mt). 
A number of further changes have been made to the programme for 2008/9. The completed 
farm household register has been used to list coupon allocations to individual beneficiaries in 
open village meetings led by teams involving MoFS and local government staff. An attempt 
to print coupons in the government printer was followed by a significant security breach and 
central and northern region vouchers were then printed outside the country with extra 
security features (a watermark and fibres only visible with UV light, and a set of very small 
identification letters, not readable by the naked eye). The flexible maize and legume seed 
voucher and cotton input systems have been continued, and grain pesticides are also being 
subsidised. Private retailer involvement in the sale of subsidised fertilisers has, however, 
been discontinued.  This has been associated with more stringent monitoring of ADMARC 
markets with prompt police action where market staff have accepted counterfeit coupons. 
Contracts for extra fertiliser purchases beyond that originally budgeted were awarded during 
the season.    
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Table 2: Principal changes in programme design and implementation, 2005/6 to 2008/9 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 
                  
Subsidised inputs Maize & tobacco fertilisers, Maize seed (OPV)  
Maize & tobacco fertilisers, 
Maize seed (hybrid & OPV)  
Maize & tobacco fertilisers, 
Maize seed (hybrid & 
OPV); legume seed 
(limited); cotton seed & 
chemicals 
Maize & tobacco fertilisers, 
Maize seed (hybrid & OPV); 
legume seed, cotton seed & 
chemicals, maize storage 
chemicals 
Voucher distribution system 
District allocation by maize 
areas, distribution through 
TAs 
District allocation by maize 
areas, distribution varied, 
through local government, 
TAs, VDCs, MoAFS 
District allocation by farm 
hh & areas, distribution 
through MoAFS and VDCs 
District allocation by farm 
hh & areas; use of farm 
household register, open 
meetings for allocation & 
disbursement led by 
MoAFS 
Voucher redemption systems Only through SFFRFM & ADMARC 
Fertilisers also through 
major retailers; flexible 
maize seed vouchers 
through wide range of seed 
retailers  
Fertilisers also through 
major retailers; flexible 
maize & legume seed 
vouchers through wide 
range of seed retailers; 
cotton inputs through ADDs  
Fertilisers only through 
ADMARC & SFFRFM; 
flexible maize & seed 
vouchers through wide 
range of seed retailers; 
cotton inputs through ADDs   
Other system innovations   
Coupons specific to 
fertiliser type. Fertiliser buy 
back system. Involvement 
of logistics unit 
Reduced copies of 
coupons. Remote EPA 
premium. Fertiliser buy 
back system 
Extra coupon security 
features & market 
monitoring. No remote EPA 
premium. ADMARC 
computers for voucher 
processing 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet), 2006/7 (SOAS et al) and 2007/8 (MoAFS) evaluation reports; key informants; MoAFS Implementation 
guidelines. 
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Table 3 Planned & achieved subsidy allocations 
 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9* 
  planned actual planned actual planned actual planned actual 
North % fertiliser sales 22% 19% 14% 18% 17% 17% 14% 19% 
Centre % fertiliser sales 47% 50% 47% 48% 44% 48% 41% 39% 
South % fertiliser sales 31% 31% 38% 34% 39% 35% 44% 42% 
Vouchers / farm family: North  1.52 1.30 1.03 1.51 1.22 1.78 0.97 1.54 
Vouchers / farm family: Centre 1.03 1.05 1.08 1.28 1.05 1.57 0.92 0.98 
Vouchers / farm family: South 0.52 0.49 0.70 0.73 0.79 0.94 0.89 1.09 
Vouchers / farm family: All 0.83 0.80 0.89 1.04 0.99 1.29 0.96 1.10 
 
Notes:  
* 2008/9:  Planned allocations exclude extra contracts awarded in December 2008 
Vouchers / farm family: Farm families from 2005/6 and 2008/9 beneficiary matrices, interpolated for 2006/7 and 2007/9. Planned regional allocations for 
2007/8 and 2008/9 exclude unallocated vouchers 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet) and 2006/7 (SOAS et al) evaluations; MoAFS beneficiary matrices . 
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5 Achievements 
Evaluation of programme achievements involves consideration of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the programme in achieving its objectives (in terms of outputs, outcomes and 
impacts), allowing for other programme impacts (positive and negative) beyond those 
explicitly recognised in programme planning and budgeting. No formal performance targets 
have been established for the programme. Figure 1 below provides a framework for 
considering the variables and issues that should or could be included in a full performance 
evaluation. We consider in this section the scale of implementation tasks; innovation and 
adaptation in implementation; implementation performance; and outputs and impacts.   
 
2. Rural Household Impacts
1.Subsidy Implementation
a. Implementation efficiency 
& cost effectiveness
Scale, cost, procurement & 
distribution modalities, 
formulations, timing, ‘targeting’, 
perfornancetargets 
4. Effects on Macro economy
Fiscal balance
Foreign exchange balance
Health, education, 
infrastructure spending
3.Input supply system 
c. Input market development 
gains
Private sector (fertiliser 
importers, seed producers, 
large retailers, agrodealers)
ADMARC/ SFFRM
Profits, cash flow, confidence, 
volumes different inputs, prices, 
investment, innovations, other 
services, market shares, 
displacement,
Other macro-
economic 
management
Political & 
policy 
processes
Previous 
season(s) 
events & 
outcomes 
Weather 
Disease 
(HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, etc) 
Other rural 
economic 
activities
Global & 
regional 
prices 
Maize price 
policies
2a Effects on recipients
(different hholds& hhold
members) 
Input access, choice, cost, use. 
Extension support. Farm & non-
farm activities. Production & 
productivity
Labour hire in/out
Crop purchases / sales
Income & food security
Welfare
2b Effects on non-recipients
(different hholds& hhold
members)
Input access, choice, cost, use. 
Extension support. Farm & non-
farm activities.  Production & 
productivity
Labour hire in/out
Crop purchases / sales
Income & food security
Welfare
Labour markets 
(wages, supply/ 
demand)
5.Maize markets, 
(volumes,prices, 
storage,imports, 
exports
 
Figure 1. Framework for performance evaluation 
 
5.1 Scale of implementation 
The scale of the programme each year has been growing, and involves complex and very 
significant logistical and organisational challenges to tight deadlines. Major tasks are shown 
in figure 2. This is a highly simplified summary, with a complex set of activities needed for 
the completion of each task. It also does not show the scale of these tasks and of the 
interactions between various stakeholders: in 2008/9 this involves selection of over 2.5 
million beneficiaries from around 3.5 million registered farm households, printing and 
distribution of 5.9 million coupons, and purchase and distribution of over 3.4 million bags of 
fertiliser – all to tight deadlines, to farmers (a significant number of whom are illiterate or 
semi-literate) widely dispersed across the whole country, some in remote and poorly 
accessible areas, with the constant temptation and threat of fraud or theft of highly valuable 
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commodities worth  approximately MK16 billion (or US$220 million) in total, with each 
fertiliser coupon worth more than 10% of annual household income for the more than 40% of 
the population below the poverty line.  
 
Planning & 
budgeting
Secure coupon 
printing
Coupon 
distribution
Beneficiary 
identification
Coupon 
allocations
Farmer 
registration
Coupon 
redemption
Input  distribution 
(transport & 
storage)
Input  
purchase
Coupon 
issue
Coordination 
& control
Payments 
& control
 
Figure 2. Major tasks in programme implementation 
 
Evaluation of programme achievements needs to take account of the scale and complexity 
of implementation challenges, and of the ways that the programme seeks to address 
inevitable difficulties and to progressively improve performance.  
5.2 Innovation and adaptation 
The 2005/6 subsidy programme built on Malawi’s innovative experience in implementing the 
starter pack (SP) and targeted input programme (TIP). These involved large scale 
registration and targeting across the country; development of systems using vouchers; 
coordination across different government, parastatal, private sector, donor and community 
stakeholders; and substantial logistical challenges. The 2005/6 programme involved a 
change in objectives (from an emphasis on social protection and food security for vulnerable 
households in the TIP to national food production and self sufficiency), an increase in scale 
of subsidised inputs (from around 50,000 mt of fertiliser in 2004/5 to 130,000mt in 2005/6), 
the addition of tobacco inputs, and cash redemption of vouchers.  
Following the experience of 2005/6, the government has, with other stakeholders, 
implemented further innovations in attempts to address implementation difficulties, to 
improve performance of the programme (discussed below), and to broaden programme 
impact. These changes emerged from formal and informal management and evaluation 
reviews and lesson learning within the government (formal internal evaluations were 
conducted in 2006/7 and 2007/8); concerns of and discussions with other stakeholders 
(donors, private sector fertiliser importers and seed and fertiliser suppliers, parliamentary 
committee on agriculture, civil society; external evaluations (commissioned by CISANet for 
Stakeholders
FARMERS
MoAFS:  HQ, LU, ADDs, DADOs, Ass, FAs
DCs, TAs,  VDCs, Police, CSOs
Fertiliser importers, retailers
Seed producers/importers, retailers
ADMARC: HQ, districts, markets
SFFRFM: HQ, depots, markets
Transporters
Donors
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2005/6 and by the Governments, DFID and USAID for 2006/7); and changing policy 
concerns in a changing economic and political environment.  
The major modifications in 2006/7, 2007/8 and 2008/9 were discussed briefly above in 
section 4 and summarised in table 2. They concerned  
• the extent and modalities of private sector involvement in fertiliser imports, fertiliser 
sales and seed sales, with a buy-back scheme to reduce government stock holding 
risks and, in 2007/8, a premium to stimulate private retail network development in 
more remote areas;  
• recognition of the importance of including vulnerable households in targeted 
beneficiaries, with increasing volumes of inputs for maize production and modified 
district / EPA allocation systems;  
• trialling of flexible vouchers for seed inputs and addition of cotton inputs and grain 
storage pesticides 
• the introduction of beneficiary registration and more open and more tightly managed 
beneficiary selection, voucher distribution and market monitoring systems;  
• coupon design, printing, security and farmer redemption prices; and  
• shared funding with donors of some programme components.  
 
5.3 Implementation Performance 
Effectiveness and efficiency of implementation can be considered in terms of (a) volumes of 
subsidised inputs disbursed, (b) the timing of subsidy sales and supplier payments, (c) 
targeted beneficiary access to inputs, and (d) cost. We consider these in turn.  
As shown earlier in table 1, both planned and disbursed volumes of subsidised inputs have 
increased steadily from 2005/6. Disbursement targets were not met in 2005/6, but have been 
exceeded in 2006/7 and 2007/8, by 16% and 27% respectively. Exceeding disbursement 
targets demonstrates considerable success in meeting demand, but also suggests difficulties 
in controlling disbursement and it contributes to cost overruns.  
Timing of subsidy sales is determined by the timing of availability of inputs in markets and 
by timing of issue of vouchers to beneficiaries. For fertilisers the timing of input availability 
depends upon timing of tendering of input purchases and supplier deliveries to depots, and 
on staffing and stocking of input markets (for parastatal sales) and upon subsidy redemption 
contracts with retailers and their stocking and staffing of input sales points for private sector 
sales. Coupon issue depends upon timing of beneficiary registration, voucher allocations, 
voucher printing, voucher distribution to districts, and district distribution payments. 
Information on some of these variables is given in table 4.  This shows general 
improvements in performance over time as regards earlier award of seed and fertiliser 
contracts and earlier fertiliser deliveries to depots and uplifts. Information on the timing of 
fertiliser sales is incomplete but current information suggests that this is also improving. 
Receipt of seed vouchers by the logistics unit is determined by the timing of sales and the 
speed of voucher processing by seed suppliers – it seems that there were problems with 
both in 2007/8.  
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Table 4: Implementation performance indicators. 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 
    actual planned actual planned actual planned actual 
Fertilisers 
        
Tender awards for parastatal supplies       late August   mid August   end July 
Depot receipts end Oct as % parastatal total sales   n/a   32%   58%   53% 
Depot receipts end Nov as % parastatal total sales   n/a   77%   76%   71% 
Depot receipts end Dec as % parastatal total sales   n/a   95%   90%   93% 
Outstanding payments end Nov ( % & MKmillion)   n/a 28% 1,216 22% 1,595 16% 3,500 
Outstanding payments end Dec  ( % & MKmillion)   n/a 46% 4,303 13% 1,192 13% 3,690 
Outstanding payments end Jan ( % & MKmillion)   n/a 14% 1,406 21% 2,620 n/a 7,707 
Uplifts despatched by end Nov as % parastatal total sales    n/a   64%   70%   75% 
Uplifts despatched by end Dec as % parastatal total sales    68%   96%   85%   90% 
Relocation transport by end Dec (MK million)   n/a   n/a   2.7   18.7 
Total relocation transport  (MK million)   n/a   n/a   68.4   42.0 
Finalisation of retail fertiliser contracts   n/a   early Nov   mid/late Nov   n/a 
District voucher allocations   n/a   early Sept   9th Oct   12th Sept 
Voucher printing   n/a   end Sept   end Oct SR early Oct 
CR/NR early 
Nov 
Voucher & lists distribution to districts   n/a virtually completed 7th November  
virtually completed 3rd 
November  
virtually completed 18th 
November  
Sales by end Nov as % total season sales    n/a   8%   n/a   30% 
Sales by end Dec as % total season sales    47%   74%   n/a   68% 
Sales by end Jan as % total  season sales    n/a   96%   88%   94% 
SFFRFM/ADMARC voucher returns end Nov ('000)   n/a   0   0   17 
SFFRFM/ADMARC voucher returns end Dec  ('000)   n/a   0   101   175 
SFFRFM/ADMARC voucher returns end Jan ('000)   n/a   111   720   1057 
Finalisation of seed supply contracts   n/a   mid/late Nov   
mid/late 
Nov   early Nov 
Seed coupons in LU by end Nov % season sales    n/a   3%   1%   1% 
Seed coupons in LU by end Dec % season sales    n/a   27%   4%   6% 
Seed coupons in LU by end Jan % season sales    n/a   74%   18%   22% 
 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet), 2006/7 (SOAS et al) and 2007/8 (MoAFS) evaluation reports; key informants 
11 
 
 
Targeted beneficiary access to inputs is determined by coupon allocation and issues and 
by their use of coupons, which may be affected by availability of subsidy inputs in accessible 
markets and by any ‘tips’ needed to redeem coupons. Comprehensive management 
information is not available on these topics, and household surveys provide the only 
systematic information available. Results from the household survey examining the 2006/7 
programme suggest that  
• targeting criteria were highly variable across different areas1 
• overall targeting recommendations were followed to some extent in that there was a 
tendency for targeting to reach households which are productive full time farmers,  
• in some areas, particularly the south and centre, coupon allocations were modified so 
that more households received one fertiliser coupon (rather than fewer receiving two)  
• key informants tended to under-estimate the proportion of households receiving 
subsidised inputs  as compared with information from household interviews which 
revealed that a larger proportion received subsidised inputs 
• female headed and poorer households were less likely to receive coupons.  
• 75% of ADMARC and private suppliers and 100% of SFFRFM outlets suffered from 
frequent major queues 
• overall 5% of coupons were accessed with some payments with a median price of 
MK1000 
• a tip was paid for redemption of about 20% of fertiliser coupons with a mean price 
per bag of just over MK1000 (compared with the official price of MK950) and with no 
significant overall differences between parastatal and private sector suppliers 
No equivalent information is available for other seasons.  
As regards the extent to which counterfeit or non standard vouchers (those with serial 
numbers outside the ranges recorded by the Logistics Unit) have been accepted by different 
outlets, records for 2007/8 show that these (and sales without vouchers) accounted for 27% 
of ADMARC/ SFFRFM sales and 3% of private retailer sales. Rapid return of vouchers to the 
Logistics Unit is important for early identification of markets accepting counterfeit or non 
standard vouchers. Private retailers generally return coupons quickly in order to receive 
payment, but ADMARC and SFFRFM have been much slower at this. Records on voucher 
returns by ADMARC and SFFRFM during the season are not available before 2007/8, but 
performance has improved in 2008/9 (see table 4).  
As noted earlier overall costs of the programme have been over budget and increasing. This 
is due to a combination of increasing subsidy volumes, increasing prices, and failures by 
ADMARC to return to the programme the monies paid by farmers when redeeming their 
coupons.  
                                            
1
 These variations in targeting are due to the vagueness in the definition of target beneficiaries in the 
guidelines which meant that those that were targeting beneficiaries placed different emphasis on 
different criteria and hence on different categories of smallholder farmers. 
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Table 5: Fertiliser and Programme Costs 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 
  planned actual planned actual planned actual planned actual 
Total fertiliser cost of parastatal purchases  
(MK/mt) **   55,000   68,600   83,990   185,016 
Fertiliser cost delivered at depots (MK/mt) **   n/a   63,560   77,748   179,094 
Fertiliser transport costs etc  exc ADMARC 
ohead (MK/mt)   n/a   5,040   6,242   5,922 
Fertiliser cost, private retailers (MK/mt)   n/a   68,600   85,708   n/a 
Overall fertiliser cost  MK/mt ***   55,000   68,600   82,665   174,148 
Malawi Government expenditure 5,100 7,200 7,200 11,398 10,300 15,349 17,780 tbc 
Donor expenditure  0 0 1,756 1,331 800 998 1,700 tbc 
Total programme cost  (MK million)  5,100 7,200 7,500 12,729 11,500 16,346 19,480 tbc 
Total Programme cost  net of farmer 
redemption (MK million)  - recovery 
unknown 
  4,480   10,346   13,361   tbc 
Programme cost  (US$ million)  36.4 51.0 53.6 74.0 82.1 115.0 139.1 tbc 
Programme cost  as % national budget  4.3% 5.6% 5.4% 8.4% 6.7% 8.9% 8.5% tbc 
Programme cost  as % GDP   2.1%   3.1%   3.4%   tbc 
** excluding buy back brought forward.  
*** including buy back brought forward.  
2005/6 fertiliser costs may also include some seed & coupon production/ distribution. 
Donor costs for 2007/8 and 2008/9 for seed & Logistics Unit,  buyback – information on government transport and operational costs is not currently available. 
 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet), 2006/7 (SOAS et al) and 2007/8 (MoAFS) evaluation reports; GoM budget statistics. 
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Data on estimated per unit fertiliser costs and on total programme costs are given in table 5, 
excluding ADMARC overhead costs. Both fertiliser prices and transport costs have been 
rising. Estimated per unit total fertiliser cost increases from 2005/6 to 2006/7 (25%) are 
higher than would be expected from international prices which were static over the same 
period, but from 2006/7 to 2007/8 (22%) are lower than would be expected from international 
prices, which rose by around 50% or more – so that the cost increase from 2005/6 to 2007/8 
is in line with international price increases. Marked monthly variation in international fuel 
prices in mid to late 2006 and 2007 makes it difficult to undertake equivalent analysis for 
transport costs. Fertiliser cost increases from 2007/8 to 2008/9 also appear to be roughly in 
line with increases in international price increases over the same period (about 125%).  
 There have been substantial cost overruns in the implementation of the programme. For 
example, in 2005/06 the programme spent 41% above the budget and this increased to just 
under 70% in the 2006/07, declined to 42% in the 2007/08 season and is over 100% in 
2008/9. The high cost overrun in 2006/07 is partly due to poor budget provision, as there 
were modest increase in volumes and lower costs of fertilizers compared to 2007/08. As a 
proportion of total government expenditure the subsidy increased from 5.6% in 2005/06 to 
8.4% in 2006/07 and 8.9% in 2007/08. With substantial increases in the cost for 2008/09, 
actual expenditure on the subsidy rose to more than 17% of total government expenditure. 
As a proportion of GDP subsidy programme costs have risen from 2.1% in 2005/06 to 3.4% 
in 2007/08 and to 7.4% in 2008/09. However, these costs may fall if ADMARC and SFFRFM 
remit the farmer’s redemption price to government. 
5.4 Outputs and impacts 
Major outputs and impacts of the programme involve incremental crop production, 
household food security, household incomes, export earnings (or import savings), effects on 
the Malawian input supply industry, and wider macro-economic effects. These issues were 
formally examined in the independent evaluation of the 2006/7 programme and table 6 
presents findings from that evaluation with some extrapolation to the 2005/6 and 2007/8 
programmes. 
The major objectives of the subsidy have been to achieve food self-sufficiency and 
increased income of resource poor households through increased food and cash crop 
production. Increased production results from incremental use of inputs (mainly fertilisers 
and seeds) leading to increased yields, moderated by the yield response to these inputs 
which depends upon the weather and the efficiency of input use and crop production. 
Incremental input use (the extra input use caused by the subsidy) is equal to the increase in 
input use in a subsidy year adjusted by any changes in input use that would have happened 
anyway without the subsidy, as a result of changes in input prices, output prices, and 
farmers’ access to seasonal finance. Constant annual changes in input and output prices 
and in access to seasonal finance make this difficult to estimate. Table 6 shows incremental 
fertiliser use estimates for 2005/6 and 2006/7 and predictions for 2007/8 and 2008/9, 
assuming similar implementation in these years2.  
                                            
2
 Displacement for 2005/6 and 2006/7 were estimated at around 25% and 35% respectively, and 
2007/8 is assumed to have similar displacement to 2006/7 (higher subsidy sales may increase 
displacement but greater farmer familiarity and higher fertiliser prices would be expected to reduce 
displacement). A lower displacement of 25% is assumed for 2008/9 as a result of much higher 
fertiliser prices and earlier (separate) beneficiary registration. These will be investigated further in the 
evaluation study. 
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Table 6: Programme output and impact indicators 
  2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9* 
  planned actual planned Actual planned/ 
expected actual 
planned/ 
expected actual 
Incremental fertiliser sales as % of subsidy 
sales   70-80%    60-70%  60-70%  n/a 70-80%  n/a 
Incremental fertiliser sales (mt)   104,000   115,000 140,000 n/a 151,700   
Incremental maize production (MT)    570,000   670,000 816,000 n/a 884,000 ??  
  
May-Oct06 Nov06-Apr07 May-Oct07 
Nov07-
Apr08 May-Oct08 
Nov08-
Apr09 Jul 09 Dec-09 
Domestic maize prices (MK/kg) 19.5 20.0 16.7 34.1 47.1 60.8   34.2   
SAFEX maize prices (MK/Kg) 25.5 30.0 35.0 34.7 32.6 24.5 26.7 26.7 
SAFEX import parity (MK/kg) ** 39.5 44.0 49.0 48.7 46.6 38.5 40.7 40.7 
Maize price in BC & fiscal efficiency analysis  20.0   21.6 35.0    tbc 
Fertiliser price in analysis  55,020   68,600 82,600    tbc 
Benefit cost ratio: high response   1.38   1.30 1.90    tbc 
Benefit cost ratio: moderate   1.12   1.06 1.54    tbc 
Benefit cost ratio: low response   0.86   0.81 1.18    tbc 
Fiscal efficiency: high response   0.76   0.44 1.13    tbc 
Fiscal efficiency: moderate   0.24   0.08 0.68    tbc 
Fiscal efficiency: low response   negative   negative 0.22    tbc 
Private sector fertiliser subsidy tender 
deliveries (mt)   70,000   99,386   97,845   162,840 
Private sector fertiliser subsidy tender 
deliveries (%)   48%   72%   71%   88% 
% fertiliser retail by private sector   0% 0%   28%   24%  0%  
  2005   2006   2007   2008   
Poverty incidence 50%   45%   40%   tbc   
Wasting % U5s 6.8%   6.8%   5.8%   tbc   
U5s Severe underweight 6.4%   6.3%   4.9%   tbc   
Meals per day 2   2.15   2.3   tbc   
*   2008/9:  Information on costs not yet available 
** SAFEX import parity = SAFEX price plus MK14/kg.  
Benefit cost ratio: Gross incremental benefits divided by gross incremental cost, valued at social prices  
Fiscal efficiency: net economic benefit divided by fiscal cost. 
Sources: Logistics Units reports; 2005/6 (CISANet) and 2006/7 (SOAS et al) evaluation reports, FNSP M&E 6th report draft, NSO. 
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Estimated incremental fertiliser sales increased from 2005/6 to 2006/7 despite an increase in 
displacement rates, due to increased subsidy volume, and a further increase is estimated for 
2007/8 if displacement rates were kept down. Estimated incremental fertiliser sales as a 
result of subsidy sales in 2008/9 are higher than in 2007/8 as a result of higher sales and  
anticipated reduction in displacement due to high fertiliser prices and improved registration 
and allocation procedures.  
Incremental fertiliser sales should lead to incremental maize production, depending upon 
rainfall, crop variety and management, including timing of planting, weeding, timing and 
methods of fertiliser application, and soil fertility.  Assuming a moderate response to fertiliser 
of 15kg grain per kg of N (with reasonable weather in all four years), there should be a rise in 
incremental maize production across the four years (not allowing for transfer of fertiliser to 
cash crops). National smallholder crop estimates suggest very large maize production 
increases from 2005 to 2006 and 2007, a fall back in production, area and yields in 2008, 
and another large increase in 2008/9. Estimates of smallholder tobacco production show a 
decline in production between 2005/06 and 2006/07 but a 44% increase in the 2007/08 
season. The increase in production was accompanied by increases in auction prices by 92% 
between 2006/07 and 2007/08. Following better tobacco prices last season there are reports 
of increased registration of smallholder tobacco farmers and increased volumes of tobacco 
coming to the auction floors. There is however no evidence from preliminary survey results 
of any net diversion of maize fertilizers to tobacco. Crop estimate cotton yields in 2008 have 
increased slightly over 2007, though by less than the increase in 2007 over 2006. In relating 
these estimates to subsidy impacts there are questions about the effects of rainfall, storage 
losses and other aspects of crop management and about reliability of data.  
Estimated increased maize production in 2007 led to authorisation of export of 400mt of 
grain to Zimbabwe, and subsequent exports of 330mt, but the price and value of these 
exports has been difficult to ascertain. Increased maize production would be expected to 
lead to falling maize prices. This was observed in 2006/7 (following the 2005/6 harvest) but 
not in subsequent years, which have seen rising prices. Reasons for this may include some 
combination of smaller than estimated production gains, storage losses, exports, rising 
international prices and a generally thin domestic market in maize (with the vast majority of 
maize produced not entering the market). 
The economic returns to the programme depend upon the economic price of maize, the 
price of inputs, and production responses to increased input use. Benefit : cost ratios 
estimated for the 2006/7 programme showed that the net economic return to the project is 
very sensitive to maize prices and the production response, and with reasonable variation in 
assumptions could range from 0.76 to 1.36 with a mid estimate of 1.06. Adjustments to this 
analysis using estimated maize and fertiliser prices for other programme years suggest that 
both the 2005/6 and 2007/8 programmes should have yielded equivalent or higher returns, 
but the very high fertiliser prices that prevailed when fertilisers were being purchased for the 
2008/9 programme and the subsequent fall in maize prices (and hence fall in the value of the 
output) will adversely affect returns in 2008/9, irrespective of any changes in implementation. 
Fiscal efficiency estimates (net economic benefit per unit fiscal investment) show a similar 
pattern to economic returns, but are also (negatively) affected by high rates of displacement 
of unsubsidised sales by subsidised sales, as these lower the net benefit from the costs of 
subsidised sales. The key conclusions from the benefit cost and fiscal efficiency analysis are 
that (a) economic returns are highly sensitive to the yield response to fertiliser, (b) fiscal 
returns are highly sensitive to displacement rates, and (c) with good programme 
implementation and good (but achievable) yield responses to fertiliser the programme can 
be a very good investment. It is therefore critical that programme design and implementation 
deliver low displacement and high responses to inputs.  
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While economic cost benefit and fiscal efficiency analysis can yield valuable information 
about programme efficiency, they can be misleading when examining the contributions of the 
programme to poverty reduction, growth and food security. This arises because although 
high maize prices increase the estimated economic return of the programme, high domestic 
maize prices are damaging to household food security for food deficit households and 
depress real incomes for food buyers. High food prices are therefore likely to depress 
poverty reduction, growth and nutritional benefits from the programme. As noted earlier, 
domestic maize prices fell following the introduction of the programme in 2005/6, but have 
subsequently been rising.  Preliminary analysis of first round data collected in the 2008/9 
evaluation study show that rural wages have been increasing faster than maize prices, and 
hence real incomes of both deficit and surplus producers have been increasing. Poverty 
rates are estimated to have fallen over the last few years, and wasting has also declined. 
Attribution of these changes to the programme is difficult, but greater food availability and 
access as a result of the programme should have contributed to these gains, and the 
geographical pattern of  wage rate changes observed in 2008/9 are consistent with 
modelling of subsidy programme impacts in the 2006/7 evaluation study.  
The large size of the programme could be expected to have macro-economic impacts. There 
was no evidence of this in 2006/7, in the context of sound macro-economic management 
and wider growth in the economy. The situation may have changed in 2008/9 with the 
dramatic increase in costs as a result of high fertiliser prices.  
The programme also has major impacts on private sector input suppliers. Fertiliser importers 
have been responsible for generally increasing proportions and volumes of government 
subsidy sales, with particularly large volumes in 2008/9. However the exclusion of private 
sector companies from retail subsidy sales in 2005/6 led to substantial falls in sales from 
retail outlets. These recovered in 2006/7 and 2007/8 with the inclusion of larger chains in 
retail subsidy sales, but falls in retail outlet fertiliser sales are reported in 2008/9. Information 
on the effect of an attempt in 2007/8 to promote the private fertiliser sales in more remote 
EPAs is not currently available. Small agrodealers have been excluded from subsidised 
fertiliser sales but appear to have benefited from involvement in subsidised seed sales.  
6 Challenges 
Consideration of the achievement and impacts of the programme from 2005/6 through to 
implementation of the 2008/9 highlight a number of challenges for programme design and 
implementation.  
Most importantly, there are serious questions as regards cost control and sustainability of 
the programme as a result of its burgeoning cost (particularly in 2008/9, with the very high 
global fertiliser prices in mid 2008) and increasing demand on the national budget (see table 
5).  While fertilizer prices have increased, farmers’ redemption prices have fallen, so 
subsidies per farmer have increased substantially. International fertiliser prices have since 
fallen back to prices similar to those of late 2006, but international and SAFEX maize prices 
have also fallen back, and the future of commodity prices is highly uncertain.  
Increases in programme cost have not arisen only as a result of increased fertiliser prices, 
the scale and scope of the programme has also increased. Increases in scale are shown by 
budgeted subsidised fertiliser sales increasing by 24% from 2005/6 to 2008/9, and actual 
sales increasing by 65% from 2005/6 to 2007/8, though in 2008/9 they fell back a little from 
2007/8). The scope of the programme has expanded with the introduction in 2007/8 and 
2008/9 of flexi vouchers (for legume and cotton seed as well as maize), cotton chemicals 
and grain storage pesticides, and extension of the programme to support tea and coffee 
farmers in 209/10.  
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Concerns about the sustainability, cost, scale and scope of the programme require particular 
attention to effectiveness and efficiency. This raises questions about the objectives and 
impacts of the programme, the targets it needs to meet, and aspects of design and 
implementation which are the most important determinants of effectiveness and efficiency in 
meeting those targets.   
7 Ways forward 
It is important that if the considerable achievements of the programme from 2005/6 are to be 
built on and the current challenges addressed, then a number of wide ranging and important 
questions need to be considered, about programme objectives and outcomes, about 
implementation systems, and about complementary policies.  
Tables 7, 8 and 9 map out some of the options facing policy makers and programme 
management, and the strengths and weaknesses of different options in contributing to 
different aspects of programme efficiency and/or effectiveness. Contributions to programme 
efficiency and effectiveness are represented by scores. Some contributions will be very 
context dependent, for others there is a limited empirical base. These tables are therefore 
not intended to be definitive, but are put forward to stimulate analysis, discussion and debate 
as regards both ongoing decisions about the programme and about topics needing further 
information and/or analysis. ‘+’ and ‘-‘ indicate positive and negative contributions, while 
underlining indicates a dominant contribution driving other contributions 
Table 7 sets out 4 key issues (targeting, scale, scope and technical package) which have 
significant effects on all the major objectives or potential objectives of the programme. These 
are impacts or potential impacts which fit within broader government goals (as for example in 
the MDGS): household food security, agricultural productivity, input market development, 
social protection, poverty reduction, nutrition, rural incomes, and soil fertility replenishment. 
Different options regarding the key four key programme issues are listed, and for each of 
these broader considerations stated, and then each option is scored against each impact or 
potential impact, the scorings representing likely contributions of the programme if it 
incorporated this option. Scorings necessarily involve simplifications and judgements: 
impacts will depend upon synergies and complementarities and trade-offs between different 
options, and upon specific circumstances. Nevertheless the table provides a useful summary 
and framework for policy and management analysis and decisions. 
Table 8 considers issues more concerned with the implementation of the programme and 
their outcomes on programme costs and effectiveness. Private sector roles and systems are 
considered here although the role of the private sector is a very major policy issue affecting 
programme impacts, particularly input market development, and thus warrants inclusion in 
table 7. Input market development is therefore explicitly considered here (as in table 7) as a 
criterion against which different options are judged. Other issues considered (in addition to 
private sector roles) are voucher systems; beneficiary selection and registration and coupon 
distribution systems; planning and management information; and cost control systems. 
Criteria on which these are scored are contributions to input market development (as noted 
earlier); effectiveness; capital, input and administrative cost saving; reduction or control of 
subsidy diversion to other uses or recipients;  reduction or control of fraud; and reductions in 
farmer costs in accessing subsidised inputs.  
Finally Table 9 considers the roles of complementary policies in furthering the effectiveness 
of the programme in achieving the objectives / impacts outlined earlier for table 7. 
Complementary polices that are important here are considered to be maize market policy, 
infrastructure development, research and extension, promotion of organic soil fertility, and 
social protection.  Macroeconomic management and policy is not considered here but has 
wide and overarching impacts on the programme.  
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Table 7. Key issues affecting major programme objectives 
      
IMPACTS 
      
Main Other National Level 
      
Household 
food 
security 
Agric. 
Prod-
uctivity 
Input 
market 
dev. 
Social 
prot-
ection  
Poverty 
red-
uction 
Nutrition Rural incomes 
Soil fertility 
replen-
ishment 
Issues Options Considerations 
                
Targeting 
Universal but smaller 
packages 
Most transparent & straight forward in practice, 
moderate displacement, informally being practiced ++ ++ + ++ ++ + ++ + 
Poorest and vulnerable 
households 
Low displacement in theory ...,  ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
..but difficult in practice ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Most productive 
households Higher displacement, higher fiscal inefficiency 0 0 -- 0 0 0 + 0 
Fixed cohort of 
households over time 
Reduced administration costs, politically difficult; 
extra benefits only if well targeted + + + + + + + + 
Between communities Links to crops in different areas, politically difficult + + + + ++ + ++ + 
Scale 
Reduced households Reduced costs, achievements change with method of targeting, radical cuts will lose market benefits 
Reduced package size 
per household Reduced costs, reduced displacement? + ++ + + + + + + 
Scope 
Only target food crops - 
maize and legumes  Reduced in costs, low to medium displacement ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Include cash crops - 
tobacco, cotton, tea 
and coffee etc 
Increased costs, higher displacement; effects will 
differ between crops + + - + + ? + + 
Technical 
package 
District based fertiliser 
recommendations  
Technical efficiencies; input costs; reduced bulk 
discounts; increased management costs ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Improved maize 
seed:fertiliser ratio Technical efficiencies; reduction in input costs ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Replacement of 
23:21:0 Reduced input costs 
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Table 8. Programme implementation issues and outcomes 
      
IMPACTS/ OUTCOMES 
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Issues Options Considerations                 
Private sector roles & 
systems 
Increased private sector 
importation 
Degree of competition, expertise and 
commitment ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ N/A ? N/A 
Increased private sector 
retailing 
Degree of competition, expertise and 
commitment; auditing systems ++ ++ ++ ? + ? + ++ 
Increased agro-dealers 
participation 
Capacity building, expertise and commitment; 
financing; coordination ++ + + ? + ? + ++ 
Remote area incentives Relative efficiencies, low displacements ++ ++ ++ ? 0 ? + ++ 
Voucher system 
Security systems 
(printing, bar codes, 
smart cards, scratch 
cards) 
Rural & system infrastructure (eg power, 
telecoms); acceptability; specificity versus 
flexibility 
++ ++ 0 0 0 ? + ? 
Flexi/Fixed price 
vouchers 
Availability of different inputs; stocking 
uncertainty; nature of inputs ++ ++ 0 0 0 - ? ++ 
Beneficiary selection, 
registration, coupon 
issue 
TAs, ADD staff, local 
government 
Related to targeting, scope & voucher systems. 
Stakeholder interests, timing; local acceptability N/A ? N/A N/A ? ? ? ? 
Open meetings (wealth 
ranking approach) 
Facilitation, local acceptability, culture, power 
structures N/A + N/A N/A - + + ? 
Earlier Timing Input and cash/credit planning by stakeholders; government budget timing + + N/A + + ? ? + 
Planning & 
management 
information 
Farm families Other information systems & needs, resources N/A + N/A + + + ? + 
Crop production and 
consumption 
Other information systems & needs, resources; 
methodologies ++ ++ ? + ? ? ? ? 
Market flows Other information systems & needs, resources ++ ++ ? + ? ? ? ? 
Cost control Planning, budgeting, 
monitoring 
Related to almost all issues above. Voucher 
security & control. + + + + + + + + 
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Table 9. Complementary policies affecting programme outcomes 
  
    
IMPACTS 
  
    
Main Other National Level 
  
    
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
f
o
o
d
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
I
n
p
u
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
 
P
o
v
e
r
t
y
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
N
u
t
r
i
t
i
o
n
 
R
u
r
a
l
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
s
 
S
o
i
l
 
f
e
r
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
r
e
p
l
e
n
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
 
Policies Options Considerations                 
Maize markets Floor & ceiling prices; private & public roles & relations 
Programme objectives; policy objectives, 
trade-offs and complementarities; 
stakeholder interests 
++ + + ++ ++ ++ ++ + 
Infrastructure Road access for input & output 
markets & wider development 
Investment trade-offs & 
complementarities: costs, returns & time 
scales; stakeholder interests 
+ + ++ + + + ++ + 
Research & Extension Investments to maintain & raise 
soil, crop & input productivity 
Investment trade-offs & 
complementarities: costs, returns & time 
scales; stakeholder interests; MoAFS 
policies 
++ ++ + + + + + ++ 
Organic soil fertility Complementary investments 
raise return to inorganic fertiliser 
Investment trade-offs & 
complementarities: costs, returns & time 
scales; stakeholder interests; MoAFS 
policies 
+ ++ + + + + + ++ 
Social protection integrated / separate policies of food & cash transfers 
Investment trade-offs & 
complementarities: costs, returns & time 
scales; stakeholder interests; GoM 
policies & coordination 
++ + + ++ ++ ++ + ? 
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Annex: benefit cost and fiscal efficiency analysis 
  2005/6  2006/7  2007/8 
  
May-
Oct06 
Nov06-
Apr07 
May-
Oct07 
Nov07-
Apr08 
May-
Oct08 
Dec08-
Mar09 
Domestic maize prices (MK/kg) 19.5 20.0 16.7 34.1 47.1   
SAFEX maize prices (MK/Kg) 25.5 30.0 35.0 34.7 32.6 23.2 
SAFEX import parity (MK/kg) 39.5 44.0 49.0 48.7 46.6 37.2 
Maize price (MK/kg) in analysis 20.02 21.56 35 
Fertiliser price (MK/mt) in analysis 55,020 68,600 82,600 
Maize price ($/mt) in analysis 143 154 250 
Fertiliser price ($/mt) in analysis 393 490 590 
Displacement 25% 35% 35% 
B:C Ratio - high grain response 1.38 1.30 1.90 
B:C Ratio - medium grain response 1.12 1.06 1.54 
B:C Ratio - low grain response 0.86 0.81 1.18 
Fiscal efficiency - high grain response 0.76 0.44 1.13 
Fiscal efficiency - medium grain 
response 
0.24 0.08 0.68 
Fiscal efficiency - low grain response negative negative 0.22 
 
*   2008/9:  Benefit cost ratio and fiscal efficiency cannot be usefully calculated until cost figures can be confirmed.  
** SAFEX import parity = SAFEX price plus MK14/kg.  
Benefit cost ratio: Gross incremental benefits divided by gross incremental cost, valued at social prices  
Fiscal efficiency: net economic benefit divided by fiscal cost. 
2006/7 as in evaluation report: other years use 2006/7 data (eg input volumes) but amend maize and fertiliser prices (including farmer payments) 
 
 
